Longevity risk and life annuity challenges around the world

Professor David Blake <u>d.blake@city.ac.uk</u>

www.pensions-institute.org

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Agenda

- Longevity and other retirement risks
- Current retirement income products
- How retirement income products can be improved
- Insurance firm solvency and risk-based capital
- Challenges for annuities and longevity risk
- A role for government in longevity risk sharing?
- Conclusions



Longevity and other retirement risks

Income needs in retirement are not smooth or certain





Risks in retirement

- Interest rate risk:
 - when annuity is purchased
- Inflation risk
- Investment and reinvestment risk
- Longevity risk:
 - outliving resources
 - leaving unintended bequests
 - failure to leave intended bequests
- Morbidity or care risk
- Pensioners have limited understanding of these risks



Variability in life expectancy

Expected distribution of deaths: male 65



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Expected distribution of deaths: male 85



Source: 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007

The challenge is huge: Individuals consistently underestimate how long they will live...



πPensions Institute Sources: O'Brian, Fenn, and Diacon, 2005, self-estimated life expectancy compared with GAD forecast life expectancy; own analysis.

Current retirement income products:

Annuities and phased withdrawal

The lifetime income guarantee provided by an annuity is funded by investment growth, the annuitant's own capital and the capital released by those dying early

Expected composition of each annuity payment for a male aged 65 purchasing an annuity for £100,000 providing an income of £7,773 payable at the end of each year to all annuitants still alive.



In the early years, investment growth is the most significant constituent of the income payment and cross-subsidy is small



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The lifetime income guarantee provided by an annuity is funded by the capital released by those dying early





At age 85 the cross-subsidy provides half of the guaranteed income and continues to grow in significance



Source: Own analysis using 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007

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If retirees continue to use phased withdrawal from age 85, many will run out of money



Source: Own analysis using 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007 and £100,000 fund

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Reducing income taken and increased investment returns have little impact on the erosion of the fund at older ages



Source: Own analysis using 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007 and £100,000 fund

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An annuity is the best option for most of the mass market

- Most pensioners have limited means
- Mass market households are likely to have to accept a relatively simple strategy with default options
- Primary focus on maximising retirement income
- Reliance on State and any housing equity for providing for health care and other retirement contingencies
- Bequests typically left more by chance
 - mainly in form of residual housing equity

Optimisation for the mass affluent is very complex

- Optimisation is an extremely difficult task for pensioners in their 60s looking forward to retirements of 20 years or more
- Very difficult task to optimise controlled run down of pensioner's assets throughout retirement
- Pensioners have varying needs and face many risks
- Many pensioners have not focused on many of these risks:
 makes optimisation difficult
- Optimal solutions are likely to differ:
 - because each set of needs and risks differ

As life expectancy reduces optimisation becomes easier

Fortunately as people get older, optimisation task becomes easier:

- fewer risks around
- investment considerations become easier
- when people go into nursing home income expenditure become less volatile

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How retirement income products can be improved



Issues to take into account

- People need reassurance that it pays to save
- Pension death benefits are generous for phased withdrawal – not for annuities
- Phasing into annuitization may be more acceptable
- Annuity products with equity linking might be valuable for those who are sufficiently risk tolerant



Money-back or capital-protected annuity

- Any pooling of mortality needs to be perceived to be fair by the public:
 - Currently, this is not true!
 - At younger ages, annuity mortality cross-subsidy gives poor value to those dying early
- Money-back or capital-protected annuity:
 - Removes single biggest consumer objection to annuities:
 "If I die soon after I retire, the annuity provider will keep my fund"



Money-back or capital-protected annuity



US-style variable annuity

- GMAB guaranteed minimum accumulation benefit
 - Guaranteed minimum fund at end of accumulation phase
- GMDB guaranteed minimum death benefit
 - Guaranteed minimum fund on death of insured
- GMIB guaranteed minimum income benefit
 - e.g. 'five for life'
 - but < annuity and higher charges, e.g. 60bp for 5% guarantee</p>
 - when VA was offering '5 for life', fixed annuity was offering '7.5 for life'
- GMWB guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit
 - guaranteed minimum amount from fund on periodic basis, regardless of fund performance
 - if for life, then equivalent to GMIB

Other new product ideas

- Advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA)
 - An annuity that begins paying after a significant deferral period, e.g. 20 or 30 years
- Life care annuity
 - An income annuity that pays an increased benefit if the purchaser needs care



Insurance firm solvency and risk-based capital

Solvency II (2014)

- Three pillar approach in EU (same as Basel II):
- Pillar 1:
 - Minimum capital charges will apply to:
 - underwriting, credit, market and operational risks
 - Standard Model or Internal Risk Based (IRB) Model to determine regulatory capital:
 - aim to bring regulatory capital closer to economic capital
- Pillar 2
 - Supervisory pillar

operates 'ladder of intervention' between SCR and MCR

Pillar 3

Market discipline through greater information disclosure

Solvency II (2014)

Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR)

- Set as minimum capital to attract S&P BBB rating:
 - 'has good financial security characteristics, but is more likely to be affected by adverse business conditions than are higher rated insurers'
- Equiv to 99.5% probability that insurer survives one year
 - i.e., can experience a single 1-in-200 year negative event and still meet all its liabilities to policyholders

Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR)

- Minimum level of regulatory capital needed
- Below this supervisor will order suspension of new business or winding up of whole firm
 - unless firm offers credible recovery plan



Challenges for annuities and longevity risk

Population aged 60 or over: World and development regions, 1950-2050



Source: World Population Ageing: 1950-2050 (United Nations)



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Potential support ratio: World and development regions, 1950-2050



Source: World Population Ageing: 1950-2050 (United Nations)



Total support ratio (TSR) and economic growth

 Ratio of the number of workers to the number of both young and old people
 High TSR is typically associated with rapid economic growth

Cf China, India and Korea

 In Japan, TSR peaked in 1992 and its economy has been fairly static since



Support ratios in Japan



Source: Fig. A2 in Mayhew (2009)



Relationship between growth rate in GDP and changes in TSR in Japan



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Implications of an ageing population

- Living standards likely to fall in some countries with fast-ageing populations:
 - ◆ GDP growth in EU and Japan could fall from 2% to 1% pa
 - US likely to escape this fall
 - due to more flexible labour markets
- Higher growth rates in countries with slower ageing populations
- More volatile stock markets
 - As capital flows to economies with higher returns
- Lower real interest rates
 - Investment demand falls with a smaller population
 by more than savings falls?



FTSE100 Index 1985-2012

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Implications for pension products

- Fixed annuities
 - Increasing longevity, low interest rates, and SII seriously reduce payments:
 - SII reduces payments by up to 20%
- Phased withdrawal and investment-linked annuities:
 - Increasingly volatile stock markets lead to increasingly volatile payments
 - Mitigated by a smoothing fund



A role for government in longevity risk sharing?



Longevity fan chart for 65-year old male (Cairns-Blake-Dowd model)







Survivor fan chart for 65-year-old male (CBD model)



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Longevity risk is driven by three underlying risks

Outcome probability, %



Life expectancy

Modelling Risk and Idiosyncratic (Random Variation) Risk are greater the smaller the number of scheme members and the greater the distribution of scheme benefits.



Potential role for government in helping to hedge longevity risk

Tail risk longevity bond from age 90 with terminal payment at 100 to cover post-100 longevity risk

PAYMENT





Longevity bond cash flows across ages and time



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Conclusions

- Limited ability to hedge interest rate, inflation and investment risks long term:
 - We will have to cope with living in an increasingly volatile financial world
- Hedging longevity risk becomes THE single most important consideration:
 - Essential at the level of the individual
 - Feasible at the macro level with longevity bonds



Conclusions

Annuities can be improved:
 Capital protection
 Smoothing fund
 Deferred annuities
 Linking to care costs

 But too much regulatory capital and we kill the goose that lays the golden egg!

 Also high charges can lead to significant consumer detriment



But it's if not when to annuitise

Annual mortality cross subsidy



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Thank you!

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